<193> commanded on the right; he had, I hear, two horses killed under him. The King of Prussia said very little of his cavalry,1 only that some few regiments had done very well; so, I believe, the particulars I have learnt from the officers concerning them, are very true, and the King of Prussia has rewarded and promoted three or four officers of the cavalry who distinguished themselves in the battle . . .“

Nach der Ausfertigung im Public Record Office zu London.


[Leitmeritz, 28. Juni 1757.]

Mitchell berichtet an Holdernesse, Leitmeritz 29. Juni (most secret): „ . . . I am informed, His Prussian Majesty, unaccustomed to disappointments, was a good deal dejected immediately after the battle, he, now, has recovered his spirits and applies [himself] as usual to business. I had, yesterday, a very long conversation with him, the substance of which I shall lay before Your Lordship.

He talks very reasonably and with great coolness upon the unhappy event, he sees in their full extent what may be the consequences to him, to his family and to all Europe, but he fears them not and has taken his party. He thinks an other battle lost must end in his ruin, and therefore will be cautious of venturing, but he will not lose a favourable opportunity. What chiefly distresses him, is the number of his enemies and the attacks they are threatening in the different parts of his very extended dominions. He mentioned to me again the necessity of an English fleet in the Baltic2 and said he was persuaded a very small squadron would be sufficient, and that he could not conceive why we did not speak an other language to Russia, and added that, before and after signing of the treaty with the King,3 he had the strongest and most authentic assurances from England that we were absolutely secure of Russia.4

He said what gave him most pain since the late misfortune, was that, at the great loss of men and officers, it was not now in his power to give the assistance to His Royal Highness and the Landgrave of Hesse he intended, that his impatience to fulfil his engagements with his allies, was the chief cause of his hurrying too much,5 in order to put an end to affairs in Bohemia, which the last action, if successful, would have done, that still he did not despair of bringing things to bear, tho' he must now alter his plan of operations and could not well form a new one, till he saw what steps the enemy would take.

1 Vergl. S. 177.

2 Vergl. S. 162. 163.

3 Westminster-Convention vom 16. Januar 1756. Vergl. Bd. XII, 503.

4 Vergl. Bd. XI, 413. 418; XII, 203. 236. 237. 327. 328. 351. 350. 360. 389. 414. 430. 431.

5 Vergl. S. 174. 175.