<237> Kœnigsberg, or of abandoning Kœnigsberg and the towns on the seacoast to protect the country from the ravages of Maréchal Apraxin's army.
General Fermor commands the army that is to attack Memel, which cannot long resist,1 as the garrison consists of one bataillon of invalids only:
Maréchal Apraxin's army lies entrenched near Kowno, and the Prussian army under the command of Maréchal Lehwaldt is at Tilsit upon the frontier; in this position with an enemy in front, he is in no condition to detach any part of his army to succour Memel . . .“
Mitchell berichtet an Holdernesse, Leitmeritz 11. Juli (very secret): „After the communication which is contained in my other letter of this date, the King of Prussia said, with great warmth, he did not think he should have been so used by his ally, especially after the assurances given last summer of sending a squadron into the Baltic, that it had ever been and was still his opinion, if England had spoken as she used to do, this attack of the Russians by sea would have been prevented; that certainly a very small squadron would have kept both, them and the Swedes, quiet, that, after the assurances given and the many representations made from time to time for this Baltic squadron, he had been shifted off with fair words and general promises, that it was his misfortune to have allied himself with England in her decadence,2 and to have been used as no ally of England ever was. His Prussian Majesty then put me in mind of what England had done in the war of succession and in the late war to support the Queen of Hungary. He therefore concluded that it was not want of power, but want of inclination, and a hankering after the old system, that had occasioned these strange and, he thought, unjustifiable proceedings. . . .“
Nach den Ausfertigungen im Public Record Office zu London.
9191. AN DEN GENERALLIEUTENANT BARON DE LA MOTTE.3
La Motte meldet, Minden 4. Juli, es stehe zu befürchten, dass die Franzosen weiter südlich von Paderborn her4 die Weser überschreiten und dadurch den Preussen den Rückzug nach Magdeburg abschneiden könnten. Deshalb scheine es gerathen, nicht abzuwarten, ob der Herzog von Cumberland die Weserlinie halten werde,5 sondern ohne Verzug mit den drei preussischen Regimentern nach Magdeburg aufzubrechen.
[Leitmeritz, II. Juli 1757.]6
Er soll meine Orders lesen und verstehen. Er soll sich nicht von der Weser rücken, bis dass der Duc de Cumberland solche verlasset,
1 Vergl. S. 241.
2 Vergl. S. 228. 230.
3 La Motte datirt seine Berichte am 10. Juli aus Minden, am 13. aus Münder.
4 Vergl. S. 232.
5 Vergl. Nr. 9113. 9135 u. S. 239.
6 Das Datum ergiebt die Antwort La Motte's, d. d. Calenberg 19. Juli.