<229> much as guess at the motives; that, when he entered into treaty with the King,1 he did believe that the English interest was stronger at that court than it has heen found to be, and that it would have been supported in a better manner . . .
I find His Prussian Majesty still thinks that the sending of a very small squadron last year would have prevented all the misfortune that happened in Prussia during the Iate campaign.
As to the second point, of sending national troops into Germany, when I urged the impossibility of raising more men without ruining the manufactures, he laughed, and said it was a strange way of reasoning, to prefer considerations of trade and manufactures to our own security and independency; thatwe did not seem sensible enough of the danger to which England was exposed, if things went wrong upon the Continent; that it was impossible for him to resist the united forces of all Europe.“
Mitchell spricht gegen den König die Befürchtung aus, es könne durch die Forderung von englischen Truppen für den Continent die glücklich hergestellte Einmüthigkeit im Parlament2 von neuem gestört werden.
„The King of Prussia answered, he had no notion, if the case was fairly stated that there could be one contradictory vote. He then mentioned what England had done in the war of the succession and in the late war, and concluded by saying that the necessity of sending troops upon the Continent was now much stronger than it had ever been on any former occasion, nor did he think it practicable to do without them; that even so small a number as 8000 would make a great impression upon the French, as it would convince them, and all Europe besides, that England was hearty and resolved rather to risk everything than to submit; and he added that an effort of this kind might likewise facilitate opérations in America, as it would give the French full occupation at home.
I then endeavoured to shew the incompatibility of this measure with the services in America, which required constant supplies of men. His Prussian Majesty replied with some warmth, sure the way to save America is not to suffer the French to become masters of Europe, which they will be, if your nation does not exert itself with the utmost vigour and activity in the next campaign, by land as well as by sea . . .
... As I could give no expectation that English troops would be sent, I hinted that perhaps it might be possible to reinforce His Majesty's army with some Danish. troops. The King of Prussia said he knew for certain that we should not succeed in any negociation with Denmark; that we might indeed amuse ourselves from time to time, as we had done in renewing our offers to that court, but he was persuaded they would be to no purpose; and, after repeating what he had formerly said of the impression that the sending even of a small body
1 Vergl. Bd. XI, 474- 475.; XII, 503.
2 Vergl. Bd. XV, 253.